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In the philosophy of psychiatry, there has been an ongoing dis-
pute about the capabilities and limits of the bio-natural sciences
as a source of methods and knowledge for quite some time now.
Still, many problems remain unsolved. This is at least in part due
to the regrettable fact that the opposing parties are far too rarely
prepared to swap ideas and to try to increase their mutual under-
standing. On the one hand there are those—psychiatrists as well
as philosophers—who maintain a more mentalistic and/or phe-
nomenalistic view of the psyche and its disturbances. On the other
hand there are researchers who follow biologically inspired strate-
gies: Since the human mind is something through and through
biological, mental diseases, too, can and should be explained and
treated biologically. Even though there are examples of fruit-
ful collaboration, in general the split prevails. One often gets
the impression that both sides remain in their “trenches”, busy
with confirming each other’s opinions and developing their posi-
tions in isolation. Even though there are also examples of fruitful
collaboration, the split leads to several shortcomings:
(1) Good arguments and insights from both sides of the debate
get less attention than they deserve.
(2) The further improvement of each position becomes harder
without criticism, genuinely motivated by the opposing
standpoint.
(3) The debate is not going to stop, at least not in the way it would
finish after a suggested solution finds broad support.
(4) Related to this, insisting on the ultimate aptness of one side
is just plainly wrong in almost every case, since undeniably,
most philosophical positions usually have a grain of truth
hidden in them.
In sum, many controversies persist with regard to the appropri-
ate methodological, epistemological, and even ontological level
for psychiatric explanation and therapies. In a conference which
took place in December 2011 in Muenster, Germany, we tried to
contribute to a better understanding about what really is at issue
in the philosophy of psychiatry. We asked for a possible com-
mon basis for several positions, for points of divergence, and for
the practical impact of different solutions on everyday work in
psychiatry.
The present Frontiers research topic is a fruit of that con-
ference. Since psychiatry is a subject too wide to be cov-
ered in toto, this research topic collects six target articles,
each focusing a particular aspect. They are accompanied by a
number of commentaries providing both critical and supportive
arguments.
First, Henrik Walter sets the stage by presenting what he calls
“the third wave of biological psychiatry” (Walter, 2013). The first
two waves were primarily driven by the ambition to uncover the
relation betweenmind and brain and by the integration of genetic
insights as well as the upcoming of psychopharmacology. While
these where—in a sense—one-sided, the third wave, starting only
in the last two decades of the previous century, conceptualizes
mental disorders “as brain disorders of a special kind.” As Walter
explains, they require “a multilevel approach ranging from genes
to psychosocial mechanisms.” This broader account might be an
indication that the alleged reductionism today’s biological psychi-
atry is often accused of is unjustified. Markus Pawelzik doubts in
his commentary that the “third wave,” as conceived byWalter, has
in fact the potential to overcome psychiatry’s biologistic thought
(Pawelzik, 2013). Michael Noll-Hussong picks up onWalters idea
of “waves,” arguing that the “sinks” between them have to be taken
into account, too, for an adequate understanding of psychiatry’s
momentum (Noll-Hussong, 2014). He predicts the upcoming of
a fourth wave that will arise from the background of information
integration theory, using computer-simulations of the mind to
increase our understanding of the psyche. In a third commentary
Gerhard C. Bukow cautions against using externalist approaches
of mental disorders too uncritically (Bukow, 2013). What exter-
nalist accounts need, but hardly can provide, are criteria where
to stop adding further and further external constituents to the
notion of psychiatric disorder.
In the second target article Marco Stier argues against the
reducibility of the concept of mental disorder (Stier, 2013). Even
if the mental may in principal be reducible to brain functions,
mental disorders are not, Stier holds. The reason is that we can
only call behavior disordered by comparing it to non-disordered
behavior, i.e., by using norms which, in turn, are not reducible
to anything physical. Stier’s claim has provoked a number of
critical replies. Markus Rüther finds several argumentative short-
comings in Stier’s account (Rüther, 2014). According to Rüther,
Stier’s constructivist thesis and the associated anti-reductionism
suffer from a lack of argumentative force. Similarly, Sebastian
Muders in his comment examines the relation between norma-
tivity on the one hand, and non-naturalness, non-objectivity,
and relativity, on the other (Muders, 2014). He argues that the
normative character of mental disorders does not mean that
they are non-natural, non-objective, or relative. Anneli Jefferson
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principally agrees with Stier, but adds two aspects regarding nor-
mativity and non-reducibility: she holds firstly that the impor-
tance of the mental level can be explained independently of
value judgments, secondly she points out the need to investi-
gate normativity in any kind of disease or disorder ascriptions,
not just in the mental area (Jefferson, 2014). Bettina Schoene-
Seifert stresses—in accordance with Jefferson—that values don’t
come into play only in regard ofmental disorder (Schoene-Seifert,
2014). Above that, she warns against mistaking Stier’s argument
as being one in favor of methodological antireductionism in psy-
chiatry. Peter Hucklenbroich’s commentary is on both Stier and
Walter, bringing central and well established principles of modern
medical pathology to mind (Hucklenbroich, 2014). In particu-
lar, he opposes the normativity claim, arguing that the criteria of
pathologicity are rooted in nature and not relative to social norms
and values.
The third target article by Thomas Schramme is concerned
with the autonomy of the concept of disease in psychiatry
(Schramme, 2013). On the background of classical ideas from the
philosophical debate on the mind-body problem, he argues that
denying substance dualism does not force us to adopt a purely
materialistic account of the mental. Especially, some psychiatrists’
belief that this denial necessarily leads to a neurophysiologi-
cal account of mental disorder is wrong in his eyes. Even in
the absence of any form of substance dualism we still need an
irreducible psychological level of explanation. Marcella Rietschel
argues in her commentary, contra Stier and Schramme, that
mental disorders in actual fact are somatic disorders, as actual sci-
entific insights show (Rietschel, 2014). According to Jan-Hendrik
Heinrichs the terms “psychiatric disorder” and “neural defect”
belong to different types of analysis and cannot be identified with
or reduced to each other (Heinrichs, 2014). While Schramme
argues on a more general level, Michael Jungert takes up his view
and exemplifies the irreducibility of the mental on the basis of
posttraumatic stress disorder (Jungert, 2013). Since an analysis
of the internal perspective of a patient is indispensable, neither
neuroscience nor any biological psychiatry is able to approach
mental disorders appropriately. The final comment in this section
is again on Stier and Schramme together. Gerald Ulrich stresses
that the currently prevailing “either-or interrogations” are utterly
ill-posed (Ulrich, 2014). In the context of aspect dualism regard-
ing mind and body Ulrich recommends to realize that what is at
stake is an “as-well-as” issue.
One of the central criticisms against biological accounts in psy-
chiatry is that they disregard the phenomenal perspective of the
suffering person. The target article by Kerrin A. Jacobs focuses
on this aspect by analyzing “the depressive situation” (Jacobs,
2013). Her approach is a phenomenological one, but one that is
informed by empirical research. In depression, she explains, the
pre-reflective self-evaluative dynamics of the depressed is signif-
icantly altered, leading to impairments of agency. While Jacobs
stresses the pre-reflective dimension of depression Lara Rzesnitzek
in her commentary reminds of the importance the notion of
a “self-feeling” had in early theories of depression (Rzesnitzek,
2014). Although her commentary is a “historical note” it never-
theless points to one of the most paramount problems in debates
on current biological psychiatry.
The article of Hanfried Helmchen, an experienced practic-
ing psychiatrist, cautions against any dogmatism in psychiatry
(Helmchen, 2013b). As history shows, an exclusively biological
account of mental disorder is as disadvantageous for the patient as
an exclusively social or psychological one. What is needed instead
is a biopsychosocial model of mental disorder. In his commen-
tary Marco Stier admits that the integrative account favored by
Helmchen is indeed important as a warning sign against misap-
prehensions of the mental (Stier, 2014). But he assumes neverthe-
less that it will in effect either lead to explanatory arbitrariness, or
end up as a theory that is ultimately biological.
Last not least, the target article by Lara Rzesnitzek shows that
some issues debated in today’s psychiatry have already an aston-
ishing long history (Rzesnitzek, 2013). An example of this is
the “psychosis risk syndrome”—one of the contentious points
in the preparation of the fifth revision of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Even though
attempts of identifying symptoms of a looming schizophrenia
are much older, in 1938 “early psychosis” entered the stage
as a possible independent diagnosis. Hanfried Helmchen com-
ments on ethical implications of “early psychosis,” and adds some
remarks to Rzesnitzek’s historical description (Helmchen, 2013a).
Finally, Nicolas Henckes suggests complementing this historical
picture with a sociological view (Henckes, 2014). As he points
out, psychiatric diagnoses always have a life of their own out-
side medicine. This is especially true for politics and the people
affected.
Our approach to the research topic “philosophy of psychia-
try and biologism” is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, our
aim was to bring together experts of different fields in order to
work with—and not against—each other. In this sense, the arti-
cles and commentaries of the present volume may serve as a
stepping-stone for future cooperation.
Our work on biologism in psychiatry was part of a research
fellowship of Bettina Schoene-Seifert at the Max-Planck-Society.
The respective project was entitled “Do the life sciences threaten
human self-understanding? Analyzing current debates between
sciences and humanties.” We hereby want to express our gratitude
to the Max-Planck-Society for having made possible the whole
project.
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